Unit 6: Advanced Malware Detection Using Memory Forensics - Practice Quiz

INT251 — Malware Analysis And Cyber Defence 60 Questions
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1 What is code injection?

Detecting code injection Easy
A. Encrypting files on a disk
B. Deleting unused system processes
C. Updating an application's source code
D. Placing code inside another process

2 Which memory region is most suspicious for injected code?

Detecting code injection Easy
A. A compressed backup region
B. A read-only configuration region
C. A writable and executable region
D. A shared document region

3 Which Volatility plugin is commonly used to find injected code in process memory?

Detecting code injection Easy
A. hashdump
B. malfind
C. filescan
D. netscan

4 What happens during process hollowing?

Investigating hollow process injection Easy
A. A process replaces its original code
B. A process deletes its log files
C. A process closes all network ports
D. A process compresses its memory pages

5 Why do attackers use a legitimate process for process hollowing?

Investigating hollow process injection Easy
A. To hide behind a trusted identity
B. To reduce the process priority
C. To increase available disk space
D. To repair corrupted system files

6 Which finding may indicate that a process has been hollowed?

Investigating hollow process injection Easy
A. Its memory code differs from its executable
B. Its file has a valid extension
C. Its user account has a password
D. Its window has a normal title

7 What is an API hook?

Detecting API hooks Easy
A. A document describing an API
B. A backup copy of an API
C. A password used by an API
D. A rule that redirects an API call

8 Which change commonly indicates an inline API hook?

Detecting API hooks Easy
A. A checksum stored in a log
B. A new folder in the user profile
C. A comment inside a source file
D. A jump instruction at the function start

9 Where does a kernel-mode rootkit operate?

Kernel mode rootkits Easy
A. Inside a browser web page
B. Inside a network cable
C. Inside the operating system kernel
D. Inside a user document

10 Why are kernel-mode rootkits difficult to detect?

Kernel mode rootkits Easy
A. They can modify low-level system behavior
B. They only run when the system is offline
C. They always remove the operating system
D. They are stored only in text documents

11 What is a kernel module in Windows commonly called?

Listing kernel modules Easy
A. A cookie
B. A worksheet
C. A bookmark
D. A driver

12 Which Volatility plugin lists loaded kernel modules?

Listing kernel modules Easy
A. clipboard
B. screenshot
C. modules
D. cmdline

13 What does I/O stand for in operating systems?

I/O processing Easy
A. Internal and Online
B. Instruction and Operation
C. Input and Output
D. Index and Offset

14 What structure commonly represents an I/O request in the Windows kernel?

I/O processing Easy
A. Virtual Address Descriptor
B. Process Environment Block
C. I/O Request Packet
D. Portable Executable Header

15 What does a device tree show during memory analysis?

Displaying device trees Easy
A. Messages sent through email servers
B. Relationships among devices and drivers
C. Passwords stored by user accounts
D. Files saved in browser caches

16 Why is displaying a device tree useful in malware analysis?

Displaying device trees Easy
A. It can update antivirus signatures
B. It can restore deleted documents
C. It can calculate password strength
D. It can reveal suspicious driver attachments

17 What is kernel-space hooking?

Detecting kernel space hooking Easy
A. Creating shortcuts on the desktop
B. Redirecting kernel operations to other code
C. Changing the size of a disk partition
D. Copying user files to cloud storage

18 Which Windows table has historically been targeted by kernel hooks?

Detecting kernel space hooking Easy
A. Master File Table
B. System Service Descriptor Table
C. Address Resolution Table
D. Global Offset Table

19 What is a kernel callback?

Kernel callbacks and timers Easy
A. A file created when a system boots
B. A function invoked when an event occurs
C. A folder shared by multiple users
D. A password requested by a driver

20 What is the main purpose of a kernel timer?

Kernel callbacks and timers Easy
A. To list files in a directory
B. To schedule an action for a later time
C. To assign names to user accounts
D. To encrypt data stored in memory

21 A memory scan finds a private memory region marked as executable and writable inside a signed browser process. Which additional finding most strongly supports code injection?

Detecting code injection Medium
A. The region belongs to a shared system DLL mapped in many processes
B. The region is backed by the browser executable on disk
C. The region contains ordinary browser strings and read-only pages
D. The region contains a valid PE header and an unbacked memory address

22 A suspicious process has a thread whose start address points to a memory region outside all loaded modules. What is the most appropriate interpretation?

Detecting code injection Medium
A. The process has necessarily been hollowed
B. The process must be running a kernel driver
C. The thread may have been redirected to injected code
D. The thread is executing a standard system callback

23 During hollow process investigation, a process image path identifies a trusted executable, but its main executable region in memory differs substantially from the file on disk. What should an analyst examine next?

Investigating hollow process injection Medium
A. The process memory mappings and replacement image headers
B. The keyboard layout configured for the user
C. The system volume label and disk serial number
D. The desktop wallpaper and screen resolution

24 Which combination is most consistent with process hollowing?

Investigating hollow process injection Medium
A. A suspended process with an altered entry point and unbacked executable pages
B. A service process with several normal shared-library mappings
C. A user process with a recently updated configuration file
D. A running process with signed modules and unchanged image metadata

25 A function in a system library begins with a relative jump to an address inside an unknown private executable region. What does this most likely indicate?

Detecting API hooks Medium
A. A page-file compression operation
B. A legitimate symbol-table lookup
C. A normal import table resolution
D. An inline user-mode API hook

26 A memory-forensics tool reports that a process import address points to an address outside the expected DLL. Which conclusion is most appropriate?

Detecting API hooks Medium
A. The import may have been redirected by an IAT hook
B. The address proves that a kernel rootkit is installed
C. The DLL is necessarily missing from the process
D. The process cannot resolve any imported functions

27 Why is comparing an in-memory API function with a trusted copy from disk useful during hook detection?

Detecting API hooks Medium
A. It automatically identifies every hidden kernel module
B. It determines whether the user entered a valid password
C. It can reveal modified instruction bytes at the function entry
D. It proves that all process threads are malicious

28 A rootkit hides a process from ordinary process listings but the process remains visible through raw kernel memory scanning. What technique is most likely involved?

Kernel mode rootkits Medium
A. Replacement of a document file extension
B. Encryption of the system page file
C. Modification of user browser cookies
D. Manipulation of kernel process-list links

29 Which observation provides the strongest initial evidence of a kernel-mode rootkit?

Kernel mode rootkits Medium
A. A system log contains several successful logins
B. A kernel address points to executable code in an unknown memory region
C. A user process has a large temporary directory
D. A signed application loads a documented library

30 A memory image contains an executable kernel region that is absent from the standard loaded-module list. Which next step is most useful?

Listing kernel modules Medium
A. Assume the region is a compressed user document
B. Inspect only the system browser history
C. Delete the region to prevent further execution
D. Search memory for module metadata and compare multiple module views

31 Why should an analyst compare a conventional kernel-module listing with a memory scan for driver objects?

Listing kernel modules Medium
A. The comparison calculates the process owner automatically
B. The comparison verifies the user's network password
C. The comparison can expose modules hidden from linked lists
D. The comparison restores deleted registry keys

32 A suspicious driver is associated with an I/O request path that redirects requests to a nonstandard function address. What does this most directly suggest?

I/O processing Medium
A. A harmless update to file metadata
B. Possible modification of an I/O dispatch routine
C. A routine change in the system clock
D. Normal user-mode heap allocation

33 An analyst traces a file-system request and finds that the device stack contains an unexpected filter driver. What is the primary security concern?

I/O processing Medium
A. The filter confirms that the user process is hollowed
B. The filter may inspect or alter I/O operations
C. The filter prevents all memory pages from being executable
D. The filter proves that the disk is physically damaged

34 When reviewing a device tree, which finding deserves the closest investigation?

Displaying device trees Medium
A. A standard bus driver connected to documented child devices
B. A signed system driver with a matching file on disk
C. A recognized storage driver attached to a storage device
D. An unknown driver inserted between a device and its normal function driver

35 What is the main value of displaying a device tree during memory-forensics analysis?

Displaying device trees Medium
A. It reconstructs deleted user profiles automatically
B. It identifies all encrypted files without decryption
C. It lists every command typed into a terminal
D. It shows relationships among devices, drivers, and attached filters

36 A kernel dispatch-table entry points into an executable region that does not belong to any trusted module. What is the best assessment?

Detecting kernel space hooking Medium
A. The entry is verified because it points to executable memory
B. The entry proves that the system has no active drivers
C. The entry represents a normal user-mode API redirect
D. The entry may be hooked by unauthorized kernel code

37 A system call table contains a pointer outside the expected kernel image and loaded driver ranges. What should the analyst do first?

Detecting kernel space hooking Medium
A. Remove the entire system call table from memory
B. Validate the pointer against trusted symbols and module boundaries
C. Ignore it because system call pointers are always dynamic
D. Immediately conclude that every system call is malicious

38 A kernel callback registration points to code in an unrecognized driver region. Why is this significant?

Kernel callbacks and timers Medium
A. Kernel callbacks are unrelated to monitoring system activity
B. The registration proves that the system clock is inaccurate
C. Callbacks can only execute after a user logs out
D. The callback may allow hidden code to receive sensitive system events

39 A periodic kernel timer has a deferred routine address inside an unknown executable allocation. What behavior could this support?

Kernel callbacks and timers Medium
A. User-mode display scaling without a graphics driver
B. Repeated execution of concealed kernel-resident code
C. A guaranteed hardware failure at the next boot
D. Automatic repair of all modified system files

40 Which correlation most increases confidence that a suspicious kernel callback is malicious?

Kernel callbacks and timers Medium
A. The callback points to a known routine within the kernel image
B. The callback targets unbacked code and its driver is absent from module listings
C. The callback is registered by a standard security product driver
D. The callback targets a documented routine in a signed system driver

41 A memory image shows a process with a private PAGE_EXECUTE_READ VAD containing high-entropy code but no PE header. A thread's start address lies inside this VAD, and the region has no mapped file. Which interpretation is best supported?

Detecting code injection Hard
A. The region is a demand-paged section of the process executable
B. The region is an ordinary DLL loaded through the Windows loader
C. The region is a copy-on-write page from a mapped image section
D. The region is probably injected code whose PE metadata may have been erased

42 An analyst finds an executable private VAD in explorer.exe, but executable private memory can also be created by JIT runtimes. Which additional artifact most strongly distinguishes injected shellcode from normal JIT-generated code?

Detecting code injection Hard
A. The process owns several handles to graphical user-interface objects
B. The VAD has committed pages and a balanced binary-tree node
C. The VAD's allocation base is aligned to a page boundary
D. A thread context redirects execution into the VAD after a remote memory write

43 A suspicious region is marked MEM_IMAGE rather than MEM_PRIVATE, has no corresponding loader-list entry, and contains a valid PE whose imports were resolved in memory. Which injection technique best explains these findings?

Detecting code injection Hard
A. Classic shellcode injection through VirtualAllocEx
B. Thread execution through an existing stack allocation
C. Manual mapping through a section-backed image
D. DLL loading through a normal LoadLibrary call

44 In a suspended process, the PEB reports an image base of 0x400000. The VAD at that address contains a PE whose timestamp, entry point, and section hashes differ from the executable named in the process audit information. What is the strongest conclusion?

Investigating hollow process injection Hard
A. The original image was likely replaced while preserving its expected base
B. The executable was updated on disk after all pages were faulted
C. The process is using address-space layout randomization normally
D. The loader merely relocated the original image to its preferred base

45 Which artifact combination provides the strongest memory-forensic evidence of process hollowing rather than ordinary reflective DLL injection?

Investigating hollow process injection Hard
A. A private executable VAD exists, and a worker thread begins inside it
B. An executable region exists, and its protection changed from writable to executable
C. The main image VAD is replaced, and the initial thread targets the replacement entry point
D. A hidden PE exists, and its imports reference already loaded system DLLs

46 A hollowed process retains a legitimate image path and normal PEB loader entry, but memory pages corresponding to the main executable differ extensively from the disk file. Which comparison best avoids false positives caused by relocations and import resolution?

Investigating hollow process injection Hard
A. Compare normalized executable sections while excluding expected loader modifications
B. Compare only the image timestamp recorded in the loader entry
C. Compare only the PE checksum stored in the optional header
D. Compare every in-memory byte directly with the complete disk file

47 The first bytes of an exported function in ntdll.dll contain an unconditional jump to private executable memory. The disk version begins with the expected function prologue. Which validation most directly confirms an inline hook?

Detecting API hooks Hard
A. Confirm that the DLL appears in all three PEB loader lists
B. Resolve the jump target and verify that it lies outside legitimate module code
C. Verify that the DLL's preferred image base differs from its loaded base
D. Check whether the function's export ordinal matches the on-disk ordinal

48 An application's import table entry for CreateFileW points into a signed endpoint-security DLL rather than KernelBase.dll. What is the most defensible analytical conclusion?

Detecting API hooks Hard
A. The import is unhooked because the target DLL has a valid digital signature
B. The process is malicious because every IAT entry must target the exporting DLL
C. The PE loader failed because forwarded exports cannot cross module boundaries
D. The IAT is redirected, but legitimacy requires correlation with the security product

49 A comparison of a loaded DLL with its disk image reports hundreds of modified code bytes. The module was relocated, supports hotpatching, and contains dynamically generated stubs. Which method most reliably isolates malicious hooks?

Detecting API hooks Hard
A. Treat every modified executable page as proof of an inline detour
B. Ignore all differences because relocation can modify executable sections
C. Disassemble control-flow changes and validate their destinations against trusted modules
D. Flag every byte that differs between virtual memory and the raw file

50 Pool scanning identifies a valid-looking DRIVER_OBJECT with executable code and device objects, but no corresponding entry exists in PsLoadedModuleList. Which rootkit behavior best fits this cross-view discrepancy?

Kernel mode rootkits Hard
A. Direct kernel object manipulation unlinked the driver from module bookkeeping
B. The driver is a user-mode service represented by a kernel driver object
C. The driver was loaded normally but omitted because its image is pageable
D. The module list excludes drivers that do not export dispatch routines

51 A suspected rootkit has patched a kernel data structure, but acquisition occurred during heavy system activity. Which evidence most strongly reduces the chance that the discrepancy is merely an inconsistent memory snapshot?

Kernel mode rootkits Hard
A. One pool tag appears without a valid allocation header in a compressed page
B. A module timestamp predates the operating system installation date
C. Independent structures repeatedly reference the same unlisted executable allocation
D. A single pointer differs from the value documented for another Windows build

52 A list walk reports 143 loaded kernel modules, while a pool scan reports 147 candidates. What is the best procedure for interpreting the four additional scan results?

Listing kernel modules Hard
A. Validate their PE mappings, driver objects, references, and unload state
B. Classify all four immediately as active modules hidden by a rootkit
C. Discard all four because pool scanning cannot recover loaded modules
D. Add all four to the module list without checking their allocation state

53 A kernel module list entry names netflt.sys, but its reported base maps mostly to non-executable pages and lacks a valid PE image. Pool scanning finds a valid netflt.sys image elsewhere. Which explanation is most suspicious?

Listing kernel modules Hard
A. Kernel ASLR independently randomized each page of the loaded driver
B. The list entry was manipulated to misdirect analysis away from the real image
C. Demand paging changed the module base while preserving its list record
D. The loader moved individual PE sections after inserting the module entry

54 A driver's MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE] pointer resolves to executable nonpaged pool outside every loaded module. Other dispatch entries point inside the driver's image. What is the most likely interpretation?

I/O processing Hard
A. The pointer identifies a user-mode completion port associated with the driver
B. The create dispatch routine has probably been replaced or redirected
C. The I/O manager generated a temporary dispatch routine for that IRP
D. The driver legitimately stores every create request directly in nonpaged pool

55 A pending IRP's completion routine points into an unloaded driver's former address range, while the IRP remains queued on an active device. Why is this artifact security-relevant?

I/O processing Hard
A. The IRP will be converted automatically into a synchronous user-mode request
B. The device stack will reconstruct the missing routine from the driver's file
C. The I/O manager always ignores completion routines after a driver unloads
D. Completing the IRP could transfer execution to stale or attacker-controlled memory

56 A storage device tree contains an unrecognized device object attached above the filesystem's normal filter stack. Its driver has no service entry, and its read dispatch routine enters private kernel memory. What is the strongest assessment?

Displaying device trees Hard
A. A volume manager relocated its driver image into private kernel memory
B. A user-mode filesystem registered an ordinary symbolic-link target
C. A concealed filter driver is positioned to intercept storage I/O
D. A physical device object was created automatically by the disk firmware

57 When reconstructing an attached device stack from memory, an analyst starts at the physical device object and follows only AttachedDevice pointers upward. Which limitation must be considered?

Displaying device trees Hard
A. Corrupted links may hide filters, so driver-object and attachment cross-checks are needed
B. IRPs always bypass attached devices and travel directly to the physical device
C. Every attachment necessarily belongs to the same driver as the physical device
D. The device tree can be reconstructed only from user-mode symbolic links

58 A naive x64 SSDT parser treats each table entry as an absolute pointer and reports thousands of invalid hook targets. What is the most appropriate correction?

Detecting kernel space hooking Hard
A. Mask every entry to 16 bits and add the current process image base
B. Decode entries using the build-specific relative-offset representation and symbols
C. Replace invalid entries with exports having matching system-call numbers
D. Interpret each entry as a user-mode virtual address stored by the caller

59 An interrupt descriptor table entry points inside a legitimate signed driver rather than the kernel's normal interrupt handler. Which finding would most strongly elevate this from unusual behavior to likely malicious hooking?

Detecting kernel space hooking Hard
A. The driver uses nonpaged memory and was loaded early during system startup
B. The handler address is canonical and belongs to a supervisor-mode page
C. The driver services hardware associated with a registered device object
D. The handler branches into unlisted executable pool and returns through a forged frame

60 A process-creation callback resolves to an unsigned driver that is absent from the loaded-module list. The callback remains registered, and its code pages are executable and referenced by a live driver object. What is the best interpretation?

Kernel callbacks and timers Hard
A. A hidden active driver is using the callback for process monitoring or control
B. The callback is stale because all unsigned drivers unload after registration
C. The callback is harmless because registration proves kernel authorization
D. The callback belongs to user mode because it observes process creation