Unit 6: Advanced Malware Detection Using Memory Forensics - Practice Quiz

INT251 — Malware Analysis And Cyber Defence 60 Questions
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1 What is code injection?

Detecting code injection Easy
A. Placing code inside another process
B. Encrypting files on a disk
C. Deleting unused system processes
D. Updating an application's source code

2 Which memory region is most suspicious for injected code?

Detecting code injection Easy
A. A writable and executable region
B. A shared document region
C. A read-only configuration region
D. A compressed backup region

3 Which Volatility plugin is commonly used to find injected code in process memory?

Detecting code injection Easy
A. malfind
B. filescan
C. netscan
D. hashdump

4 What happens during process hollowing?

Investigating hollow process injection Easy
A. A process closes all network ports
B. A process deletes its log files
C. A process compresses its memory pages
D. A process replaces its original code

5 Why do attackers use a legitimate process for process hollowing?

Investigating hollow process injection Easy
A. To repair corrupted system files
B. To reduce the process priority
C. To hide behind a trusted identity
D. To increase available disk space

6 Which finding may indicate that a process has been hollowed?

Investigating hollow process injection Easy
A. Its window has a normal title
B. Its memory code differs from its executable
C. Its user account has a password
D. Its file has a valid extension

7 What is an API hook?

Detecting API hooks Easy
A. A rule that redirects an API call
B. A backup copy of an API
C. A password used by an API
D. A document describing an API

8 Which change commonly indicates an inline API hook?

Detecting API hooks Easy
A. A comment inside a source file
B. A jump instruction at the function start
C. A new folder in the user profile
D. A checksum stored in a log

9 Where does a kernel-mode rootkit operate?

Kernel mode rootkits Easy
A. Inside a browser web page
B. Inside the operating system kernel
C. Inside a user document
D. Inside a network cable

10 Why are kernel-mode rootkits difficult to detect?

Kernel mode rootkits Easy
A. They can modify low-level system behavior
B. They always remove the operating system
C. They only run when the system is offline
D. They are stored only in text documents

11 What is a kernel module in Windows commonly called?

Listing kernel modules Easy
A. A bookmark
B. A worksheet
C. A cookie
D. A driver

12 Which Volatility plugin lists loaded kernel modules?

Listing kernel modules Easy
A. cmdline
B. screenshot
C. modules
D. clipboard

13 What does I/O stand for in operating systems?

I/O processing Easy
A. Instruction and Operation
B. Input and Output
C. Internal and Online
D. Index and Offset

14 What structure commonly represents an I/O request in the Windows kernel?

I/O processing Easy
A. Virtual Address Descriptor
B. Portable Executable Header
C. Process Environment Block
D. I/O Request Packet

15 What does a device tree show during memory analysis?

Displaying device trees Easy
A. Relationships among devices and drivers
B. Passwords stored by user accounts
C. Messages sent through email servers
D. Files saved in browser caches

16 Why is displaying a device tree useful in malware analysis?

Displaying device trees Easy
A. It can reveal suspicious driver attachments
B. It can update antivirus signatures
C. It can calculate password strength
D. It can restore deleted documents

17 What is kernel-space hooking?

Detecting kernel space hooking Easy
A. Copying user files to cloud storage
B. Changing the size of a disk partition
C. Redirecting kernel operations to other code
D. Creating shortcuts on the desktop

18 Which Windows table has historically been targeted by kernel hooks?

Detecting kernel space hooking Easy
A. System Service Descriptor Table
B. Master File Table
C. Global Offset Table
D. Address Resolution Table

19 What is a kernel callback?

Kernel callbacks and timers Easy
A. A folder shared by multiple users
B. A function invoked when an event occurs
C. A password requested by a driver
D. A file created when a system boots

20 What is the main purpose of a kernel timer?

Kernel callbacks and timers Easy
A. To assign names to user accounts
B. To list files in a directory
C. To schedule an action for a later time
D. To encrypt data stored in memory

21 A memory scan finds a private memory region marked as executable and writable inside a signed browser process. Which additional finding most strongly supports code injection?

Detecting code injection Medium
A. The region is backed by the browser executable on disk
B. The region contains ordinary browser strings and read-only pages
C. The region belongs to a shared system DLL mapped in many processes
D. The region contains a valid PE header and an unbacked memory address

22 A suspicious process has a thread whose start address points to a memory region outside all loaded modules. What is the most appropriate interpretation?

Detecting code injection Medium
A. The thread may have been redirected to injected code
B. The process must be running a kernel driver
C. The thread is executing a standard system callback
D. The process has necessarily been hollowed

23 During hollow process investigation, a process image path identifies a trusted executable, but its main executable region in memory differs substantially from the file on disk. What should an analyst examine next?

Investigating hollow process injection Medium
A. The system volume label and disk serial number
B. The keyboard layout configured for the user
C. The process memory mappings and replacement image headers
D. The desktop wallpaper and screen resolution

24 Which combination is most consistent with process hollowing?

Investigating hollow process injection Medium
A. A running process with signed modules and unchanged image metadata
B. A user process with a recently updated configuration file
C. A suspended process with an altered entry point and unbacked executable pages
D. A service process with several normal shared-library mappings

25 A function in a system library begins with a relative jump to an address inside an unknown private executable region. What does this most likely indicate?

Detecting API hooks Medium
A. A page-file compression operation
B. A legitimate symbol-table lookup
C. A normal import table resolution
D. An inline user-mode API hook

26 A memory-forensics tool reports that a process import address points to an address outside the expected DLL. Which conclusion is most appropriate?

Detecting API hooks Medium
A. The DLL is necessarily missing from the process
B. The address proves that a kernel rootkit is installed
C. The process cannot resolve any imported functions
D. The import may have been redirected by an IAT hook

27 Why is comparing an in-memory API function with a trusted copy from disk useful during hook detection?

Detecting API hooks Medium
A. It can reveal modified instruction bytes at the function entry
B. It determines whether the user entered a valid password
C. It proves that all process threads are malicious
D. It automatically identifies every hidden kernel module

28 A rootkit hides a process from ordinary process listings but the process remains visible through raw kernel memory scanning. What technique is most likely involved?

Kernel mode rootkits Medium
A. Replacement of a document file extension
B. Encryption of the system page file
C. Modification of user browser cookies
D. Manipulation of kernel process-list links

29 Which observation provides the strongest initial evidence of a kernel-mode rootkit?

Kernel mode rootkits Medium
A. A signed application loads a documented library
B. A system log contains several successful logins
C. A kernel address points to executable code in an unknown memory region
D. A user process has a large temporary directory

30 A memory image contains an executable kernel region that is absent from the standard loaded-module list. Which next step is most useful?

Listing kernel modules Medium
A. Delete the region to prevent further execution
B. Assume the region is a compressed user document
C. Inspect only the system browser history
D. Search memory for module metadata and compare multiple module views

31 Why should an analyst compare a conventional kernel-module listing with a memory scan for driver objects?

Listing kernel modules Medium
A. The comparison restores deleted registry keys
B. The comparison can expose modules hidden from linked lists
C. The comparison calculates the process owner automatically
D. The comparison verifies the user's network password

32 A suspicious driver is associated with an I/O request path that redirects requests to a nonstandard function address. What does this most directly suggest?

I/O processing Medium
A. A routine change in the system clock
B. A harmless update to file metadata
C. Possible modification of an I/O dispatch routine
D. Normal user-mode heap allocation

33 An analyst traces a file-system request and finds that the device stack contains an unexpected filter driver. What is the primary security concern?

I/O processing Medium
A. The filter proves that the disk is physically damaged
B. The filter may inspect or alter I/O operations
C. The filter prevents all memory pages from being executable
D. The filter confirms that the user process is hollowed

34 When reviewing a device tree, which finding deserves the closest investigation?

Displaying device trees Medium
A. A recognized storage driver attached to a storage device
B. A signed system driver with a matching file on disk
C. An unknown driver inserted between a device and its normal function driver
D. A standard bus driver connected to documented child devices

35 What is the main value of displaying a device tree during memory-forensics analysis?

Displaying device trees Medium
A. It identifies all encrypted files without decryption
B. It lists every command typed into a terminal
C. It shows relationships among devices, drivers, and attached filters
D. It reconstructs deleted user profiles automatically

36 A kernel dispatch-table entry points into an executable region that does not belong to any trusted module. What is the best assessment?

Detecting kernel space hooking Medium
A. The entry represents a normal user-mode API redirect
B. The entry proves that the system has no active drivers
C. The entry is verified because it points to executable memory
D. The entry may be hooked by unauthorized kernel code

37 A system call table contains a pointer outside the expected kernel image and loaded driver ranges. What should the analyst do first?

Detecting kernel space hooking Medium
A. Ignore it because system call pointers are always dynamic
B. Remove the entire system call table from memory
C. Validate the pointer against trusted symbols and module boundaries
D. Immediately conclude that every system call is malicious

38 A kernel callback registration points to code in an unrecognized driver region. Why is this significant?

Kernel callbacks and timers Medium
A. The callback may allow hidden code to receive sensitive system events
B. Callbacks can only execute after a user logs out
C. The registration proves that the system clock is inaccurate
D. Kernel callbacks are unrelated to monitoring system activity

39 A periodic kernel timer has a deferred routine address inside an unknown executable allocation. What behavior could this support?

Kernel callbacks and timers Medium
A. Repeated execution of concealed kernel-resident code
B. Automatic repair of all modified system files
C. A guaranteed hardware failure at the next boot
D. User-mode display scaling without a graphics driver

40 Which correlation most increases confidence that a suspicious kernel callback is malicious?

Kernel callbacks and timers Medium
A. The callback points to a known routine within the kernel image
B. The callback is registered by a standard security product driver
C. The callback targets unbacked code and its driver is absent from module listings
D. The callback targets a documented routine in a signed system driver

41 A memory image shows a process with a private PAGE_EXECUTE_READ VAD containing high-entropy code but no PE header. A thread's start address lies inside this VAD, and the region has no mapped file. Which interpretation is best supported?

Detecting code injection Hard
A. The region is probably injected code whose PE metadata may have been erased
B. The region is a demand-paged section of the process executable
C. The region is an ordinary DLL loaded through the Windows loader
D. The region is a copy-on-write page from a mapped image section

42 An analyst finds an executable private VAD in explorer.exe, but executable private memory can also be created by JIT runtimes. Which additional artifact most strongly distinguishes injected shellcode from normal JIT-generated code?

Detecting code injection Hard
A. The VAD has committed pages and a balanced binary-tree node
B. A thread context redirects execution into the VAD after a remote memory write
C. The process owns several handles to graphical user-interface objects
D. The VAD's allocation base is aligned to a page boundary

43 A suspicious region is marked MEM_IMAGE rather than MEM_PRIVATE, has no corresponding loader-list entry, and contains a valid PE whose imports were resolved in memory. Which injection technique best explains these findings?

Detecting code injection Hard
A. Classic shellcode injection through VirtualAllocEx
B. Thread execution through an existing stack allocation
C. DLL loading through a normal LoadLibrary call
D. Manual mapping through a section-backed image

44 In a suspended process, the PEB reports an image base of 0x400000. The VAD at that address contains a PE whose timestamp, entry point, and section hashes differ from the executable named in the process audit information. What is the strongest conclusion?

Investigating hollow process injection Hard
A. The original image was likely replaced while preserving its expected base
B. The executable was updated on disk after all pages were faulted
C. The loader merely relocated the original image to its preferred base
D. The process is using address-space layout randomization normally

45 Which artifact combination provides the strongest memory-forensic evidence of process hollowing rather than ordinary reflective DLL injection?

Investigating hollow process injection Hard
A. A hidden PE exists, and its imports reference already loaded system DLLs
B. The main image VAD is replaced, and the initial thread targets the replacement entry point
C. A private executable VAD exists, and a worker thread begins inside it
D. An executable region exists, and its protection changed from writable to executable

46 A hollowed process retains a legitimate image path and normal PEB loader entry, but memory pages corresponding to the main executable differ extensively from the disk file. Which comparison best avoids false positives caused by relocations and import resolution?

Investigating hollow process injection Hard
A. Compare every in-memory byte directly with the complete disk file
B. Compare only the PE checksum stored in the optional header
C. Compare only the image timestamp recorded in the loader entry
D. Compare normalized executable sections while excluding expected loader modifications

47 The first bytes of an exported function in ntdll.dll contain an unconditional jump to private executable memory. The disk version begins with the expected function prologue. Which validation most directly confirms an inline hook?

Detecting API hooks Hard
A. Confirm that the DLL appears in all three PEB loader lists
B. Resolve the jump target and verify that it lies outside legitimate module code
C. Verify that the DLL's preferred image base differs from its loaded base
D. Check whether the function's export ordinal matches the on-disk ordinal

48 An application's import table entry for CreateFileW points into a signed endpoint-security DLL rather than KernelBase.dll. What is the most defensible analytical conclusion?

Detecting API hooks Hard
A. The IAT is redirected, but legitimacy requires correlation with the security product
B. The PE loader failed because forwarded exports cannot cross module boundaries
C. The process is malicious because every IAT entry must target the exporting DLL
D. The import is unhooked because the target DLL has a valid digital signature

49 A comparison of a loaded DLL with its disk image reports hundreds of modified code bytes. The module was relocated, supports hotpatching, and contains dynamically generated stubs. Which method most reliably isolates malicious hooks?

Detecting API hooks Hard
A. Treat every modified executable page as proof of an inline detour
B. Flag every byte that differs between virtual memory and the raw file
C. Ignore all differences because relocation can modify executable sections
D. Disassemble control-flow changes and validate their destinations against trusted modules

50 Pool scanning identifies a valid-looking DRIVER_OBJECT with executable code and device objects, but no corresponding entry exists in PsLoadedModuleList. Which rootkit behavior best fits this cross-view discrepancy?

Kernel mode rootkits Hard
A. The driver is a user-mode service represented by a kernel driver object
B. The module list excludes drivers that do not export dispatch routines
C. The driver was loaded normally but omitted because its image is pageable
D. Direct kernel object manipulation unlinked the driver from module bookkeeping

51 A suspected rootkit has patched a kernel data structure, but acquisition occurred during heavy system activity. Which evidence most strongly reduces the chance that the discrepancy is merely an inconsistent memory snapshot?

Kernel mode rootkits Hard
A. One pool tag appears without a valid allocation header in a compressed page
B. A module timestamp predates the operating system installation date
C. A single pointer differs from the value documented for another Windows build
D. Independent structures repeatedly reference the same unlisted executable allocation

52 A list walk reports 143 loaded kernel modules, while a pool scan reports 147 candidates. What is the best procedure for interpreting the four additional scan results?

Listing kernel modules Hard
A. Discard all four because pool scanning cannot recover loaded modules
B. Classify all four immediately as active modules hidden by a rootkit
C. Add all four to the module list without checking their allocation state
D. Validate their PE mappings, driver objects, references, and unload state

53 A kernel module list entry names netflt.sys, but its reported base maps mostly to non-executable pages and lacks a valid PE image. Pool scanning finds a valid netflt.sys image elsewhere. Which explanation is most suspicious?

Listing kernel modules Hard
A. Demand paging changed the module base while preserving its list record
B. The loader moved individual PE sections after inserting the module entry
C. The list entry was manipulated to misdirect analysis away from the real image
D. Kernel ASLR independently randomized each page of the loaded driver

54 A driver's MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE] pointer resolves to executable nonpaged pool outside every loaded module. Other dispatch entries point inside the driver's image. What is the most likely interpretation?

I/O processing Hard
A. The I/O manager generated a temporary dispatch routine for that IRP
B. The pointer identifies a user-mode completion port associated with the driver
C. The create dispatch routine has probably been replaced or redirected
D. The driver legitimately stores every create request directly in nonpaged pool

55 A pending IRP's completion routine points into an unloaded driver's former address range, while the IRP remains queued on an active device. Why is this artifact security-relevant?

I/O processing Hard
A. Completing the IRP could transfer execution to stale or attacker-controlled memory
B. The device stack will reconstruct the missing routine from the driver's file
C. The I/O manager always ignores completion routines after a driver unloads
D. The IRP will be converted automatically into a synchronous user-mode request

56 A storage device tree contains an unrecognized device object attached above the filesystem's normal filter stack. Its driver has no service entry, and its read dispatch routine enters private kernel memory. What is the strongest assessment?

Displaying device trees Hard
A. A physical device object was created automatically by the disk firmware
B. A volume manager relocated its driver image into private kernel memory
C. A concealed filter driver is positioned to intercept storage I/O
D. A user-mode filesystem registered an ordinary symbolic-link target

57 When reconstructing an attached device stack from memory, an analyst starts at the physical device object and follows only AttachedDevice pointers upward. Which limitation must be considered?

Displaying device trees Hard
A. IRPs always bypass attached devices and travel directly to the physical device
B. Corrupted links may hide filters, so driver-object and attachment cross-checks are needed
C. The device tree can be reconstructed only from user-mode symbolic links
D. Every attachment necessarily belongs to the same driver as the physical device

58 A naive x64 SSDT parser treats each table entry as an absolute pointer and reports thousands of invalid hook targets. What is the most appropriate correction?

Detecting kernel space hooking Hard
A. Decode entries using the build-specific relative-offset representation and symbols
B. Interpret each entry as a user-mode virtual address stored by the caller
C. Replace invalid entries with exports having matching system-call numbers
D. Mask every entry to 16 bits and add the current process image base

59 An interrupt descriptor table entry points inside a legitimate signed driver rather than the kernel's normal interrupt handler. Which finding would most strongly elevate this from unusual behavior to likely malicious hooking?

Detecting kernel space hooking Hard
A. The driver uses nonpaged memory and was loaded early during system startup
B. The handler branches into unlisted executable pool and returns through a forged frame
C. The driver services hardware associated with a registered device object
D. The handler address is canonical and belongs to a supervisor-mode page

60 A process-creation callback resolves to an unsigned driver that is absent from the loaded-module list. The callback remains registered, and its code pages are executable and referenced by a live driver object. What is the best interpretation?

Kernel callbacks and timers Hard
A. The callback is stale because all unsigned drivers unload after registration
B. A hidden active driver is using the callback for process monitoring or control
C. The callback belongs to user mode because it observes process creation
D. The callback is harmless because registration proves kernel authorization