1What is the primary output of a cryptographic hash function?
hash functions and data integrity
Easy
A.A random session token
B.An encrypted message
C.A variable-size key
D.A fixed-size digest
Correct Answer: A fixed-size digest
Explanation:
A hash function maps input data of arbitrary length to a fixed-size output called a hash value or digest.
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2Hash functions are commonly used to verify which property of data?
hash functions and data integrity
Easy
A.Compression ratio
B.Confidentiality
C.Availability
D.Integrity
Correct Answer: Integrity
Explanation:
By comparing hash values, one can detect whether data has been altered, ensuring data integrity.
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3Which of the following is a well-known cryptographic hash function?
hash functions and data integrity
Easy
A.AES-128
B.DES-56
C.RSA-2048
D.SHA-256
Correct Answer: SHA-256
Explanation:
SHA-256 is a hash function from the SHA-2 family. AES and DES are ciphers, and RSA is a public-key algorithm.
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4A small change in the input of a good hash function should cause what change in the output?
hash functions and data integrity
Easy
A.A predictable shift
B.A single-bit change
C.No change at all
D.A large, unpredictable change
Correct Answer: A large, unpredictable change
Explanation:
This is called the avalanche effect: even a tiny input change should drastically alter the output digest.
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5Which property means it is hard to find two different inputs that produce the same hash?
security of hash functions
Easy
A.Preimage resistance
B.Confidentiality
C.Non-repudiation
D.Collision resistance
Correct Answer: Collision resistance
Explanation:
Collision resistance ensures it is computationally infeasible to find two distinct inputs with the same hash .
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6Given a hash value , the difficulty of finding any input such that is called what?
security of hash functions
Easy
A.Second preimage resistance
B.Collision resistance
C.Preimage resistance
D.Key resistance
Correct Answer: Preimage resistance
Explanation:
Preimage resistance (one-wayness) means that given an output, it is infeasible to find any input that hashes to it.
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7Second preimage resistance means that given an input , it is hard to find:
security of hash functions
Easy
A.The original input
B.The secret key used
C.Two inputs with different hashes
D.A different input with
Correct Answer: A different input with
Explanation:
Second preimage resistance requires that, given one input, one cannot find a second distinct input producing the same hash.
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8Which attack exploits the mathematics behind finding hash collisions more efficiently?
security of hash functions
Easy
A.Birthday attack
B.Man-in-the-middle attack
C.Replay attack
D.Brute-force key search
Correct Answer: Birthday attack
Explanation:
The birthday attack uses the birthday paradox to find collisions in roughly operations for an -bit hash.
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9Which older hash function is now considered insecure due to practical collision attacks?
security of hash functions
Easy
A.SHA-3
B.SHA-256
C.BLAKE2
D.MD5
Correct Answer: MD5
Explanation:
MD5 is broken because practical collisions can be generated, so it is no longer used for security purposes.
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10What does a Message Authentication Code (MAC) primarily provide?
message authentication codes
Easy
A.Compression only
B.Integrity and authenticity
C.Non-repudiation to third parties
D.Confidentiality only
Correct Answer: Integrity and authenticity
Explanation:
A MAC verifies that a message was not altered and confirms it came from a party sharing the secret key.
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11What input, besides the message, does a MAC algorithm require?
message authentication codes
Easy
A.A random nonce only
B.A public key
C.A digital certificate
D.A secret key
Correct Answer: A secret key
Explanation:
A MAC uses a shared secret key together with the message to produce the authentication tag.
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12Which of the following is a MAC constructed from a hash function?
message authentication codes
Easy
A.RSA
B.ECDSA
C.HMAC
D.Diffie-Hellman
Correct Answer: HMAC
Explanation:
HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) combines a cryptographic hash function with a secret key.
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13Why can a MAC not provide non-repudiation on its own?
message authentication codes
Easy
A.It uses a public key
B.It only hashes the message
C.Both parties share the same secret key
D.It has no key
Correct Answer: Both parties share the same secret key
Explanation:
Since sender and receiver share the key, either could have created the MAC, so it cannot prove which one did.
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14A MAC is also commonly referred to as a:
message authentication codes
Easy
A.Block cipher
B.Session cookie
C.Public certificate
D.Keyed hash
Correct Answer: Keyed hash
Explanation:
A MAC is often called a keyed hash because it produces a tag from a message using a secret key.
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15In a digital signature scheme, which key is used to create the signature?
digital signatures
Easy
A.The receiver's private key
B.A shared secret key
C.The signer's public key
D.The signer's private key
Correct Answer: The signer's private key
Explanation:
The signer uses their private key to sign; anyone can verify using the corresponding public key.
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16Which key is used to verify a digital signature?
digital signatures
Easy
A.A shared symmetric key
B.The signer's private key
C.The verifier's private key
D.The signer's public key
Correct Answer: The signer's public key
Explanation:
Verification uses the signer's public key to confirm the signature was produced by the matching private key.
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17Which of the following is a widely used digital signature algorithm?
digital signatures
Easy
A.SHA-1
B.AES
C.RSA
D.HMAC
Correct Answer: RSA
Explanation:
RSA can be used for digital signatures. AES is a cipher, HMAC is a MAC, and SHA-1 is a hash function.
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18Before signing, a message is usually first processed by which function for efficiency?
digital signatures
Easy
A.An encryption cipher
B.A hash function
C.A key exchange protocol
D.A compression codec only
Correct Answer: A hash function
Explanation:
The message is hashed first, and the fixed-size digest is signed rather than the entire message.
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19Which property ensures a signer cannot later deny having signed a message?
security requirements for signature schemes
Easy
A.Availability
B.Anonymity
C.Non-repudiation
D.Confidentiality
Correct Answer: Non-repudiation
Explanation:
Non-repudiation binds a signature to the signer, so they cannot deny authorship of a validly signed message.
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20A secure signature scheme should resist which of the following?
security requirements for signature schemes
Easy
A.Forgery of signatures
B.Data hashing
C.Message compression
D.Key exchange
Correct Answer: Forgery of signatures
Explanation:
A core security requirement is unforgeability: an attacker should not be able to create a valid signature without the private key.
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21A file-sharing service publishes a cryptographic hash alongside each downloadable file so users can verify integrity. If an attacker modifies the file but cannot alter the published hash, which property ensures the tampering is detected?
hash functions and data integrity
Medium
A.The avalanche effect, where a small input change drastically changes the output
B.The one-way property preventing input recovery
C.The compression property reducing input size
D.The fixed-length property of the hash output
Correct Answer: The avalanche effect, where a small input change drastically changes the output
Explanation:
Even a single-bit change in the file produces a completely different hash due to the avalanche effect, so the recomputed hash will not match the published value, revealing tampering.
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22A hash function maps inputs of arbitrary length to outputs of bits. What is the size of the output space?
hash functions and data integrity
Medium
A.
B.
C.
D.
Correct Answer:
Explanation:
An -bit output has possible values. With , the output space contains distinct hash values.
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23Which of the following is NOT a required property of a cryptographic hash function used for data integrity?
hash functions and data integrity
Medium
A.Second-preimage resistance
B.Reversibility, allowing the original message to be recovered from the hash
C.Preimage resistance
D.Collision resistance
Correct Answer: Reversibility, allowing the original message to be recovered from the hash
Explanation:
Cryptographic hash functions must be one-way (irreversible). Reversibility would defeat their security purpose. Preimage, second-preimage, and collision resistance are all required.
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24Due to the birthday paradox, roughly how many hash evaluations are needed to find a collision in a hash function with an -bit output?
security of hash functions
Medium
A.About
B.About
C.About
D.About
Correct Answer: About
Explanation:
The birthday attack finds collisions in approximately operations, which is why a -bit hash offers only about bits of collision resistance.
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25An attacker is given a hash value and must find any message such that . Which security property directly resists this attack?
security of hash functions
Medium
A.Avalanche resistance
B.Collision resistance
C.Preimage resistance
D.Second-preimage resistance
Correct Answer: Preimage resistance
Explanation:
Preimage resistance means that given an output , it is computationally infeasible to find any input with .
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26Suppose a specific message is fixed and an attacker tries to find a different with . Which property is being attacked?
security of hash functions
Medium
A.Collision resistance
B.Second-preimage resistance
C.Preimage resistance
D.Key resistance
Correct Answer: Second-preimage resistance
Explanation:
Second-preimage resistance protects against finding a second, different input that collides with a given fixed input. Collision resistance differs because there the attacker may choose both inputs freely.
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27Why are hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 considered insecure for modern applications?
security of hash functions
Medium
A.Practical collision attacks against them have been demonstrated
B.Their outputs are too long to store efficiently
C.They require a secret key that is easily leaked
D.They cannot process messages longer than MB
Correct Answer: Practical collision attacks against them have been demonstrated
Explanation:
Researchers have produced actual colliding inputs for MD5 and SHA-1, breaking their collision resistance and making them unsuitable for security-critical use.
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28If collision resistance holds for a hash function, which of the following is guaranteed?
security of hash functions
Medium
A.Preimage resistance is impossible
B.The function is reversible
C.Second-preimage resistance also holds
D.The output length must be variable
Correct Answer: Second-preimage resistance also holds
Explanation:
Collision resistance is the strongest of the three properties and implies second-preimage resistance: if you could find a second preimage, you would have found a collision.
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29What is the primary security goal provided by a Message Authentication Code (MAC) that a plain hash function alone does not provide?
message authentication codes
Medium
A.Compression of the message to a fixed size
B.Authentication of the message origin using a shared secret key
C.Encryption of the message content
D.Non-repudiation to a third party
Correct Answer: Authentication of the message origin using a shared secret key
Explanation:
A MAC uses a shared secret key so the receiver can verify that the message came from someone who knows the key, providing origin authentication and integrity that a keyless hash cannot.
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30In the HMAC construction , why is the hash function applied twice?
message authentication codes
Medium
A.To double the length of the final output
B.To avoid the need for a secret key
C.To allow encryption of the message
D.To defend against length-extension attacks on the underlying hash
Correct Answer: To defend against length-extension attacks on the underlying hash
Explanation:
The nested (double) hashing with the inner and outer keyed pads prevents length-extension attacks that would otherwise affect simple constructions like .
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31Why is the naive MAC construction using a Merkle–Damgård hash considered insecure?
message authentication codes
Medium
A.It cannot handle binary messages
B.It requires two keys instead of one
C.It produces variable-length tags
D.It is vulnerable to a length-extension attack
Correct Answer: It is vulnerable to a length-extension attack
Explanation:
With a Merkle–Damgård hash, an attacker can extend the message and compute a valid tag for without knowing , breaking the MAC.
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32Two parties share a secret key and exchange MACs to authenticate messages. Which security guarantee is NOT provided by a MAC?
message authentication codes
Medium
A.Origin authentication between the two parties
B.Non-repudiation to a third party
C.Message integrity
D.Detection of message tampering
Correct Answer: Non-repudiation to a third party
Explanation:
Because both parties share the same key, either could have produced a valid MAC, so a MAC cannot prove to a third party who authored the message. Digital signatures are needed for non-repudiation.
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33A MAC scheme is said to be secure if an adversary cannot achieve which of the following?
message authentication codes
Medium
A.Recovery of the message from its tag
B.Generation of random keys
C.Existential forgery of a valid tag for a new message
D.Compression of the message length
Correct Answer: Existential forgery of a valid tag for a new message
Explanation:
MAC security is defined by resistance to existential forgery under chosen-message attack: the adversary should not be able to produce a valid tag for any message not previously authenticated.
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34In a standard digital signature scheme, which key is used to create a signature and which is used to verify it?
digital signatures
Medium
A.Sign and verify both with a shared secret key
B.Sign with the public key, verify with the private key
C.Sign and verify both with the private key
D.Sign with the private key, verify with the public key
Correct Answer: Sign with the private key, verify with the public key
Explanation:
Only the signer holds the private key to produce a signature, while anyone can verify it using the corresponding public key, providing authentication and non-repudiation.
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35In RSA signatures, a message hash is signed as . How does a verifier check the signature?
digital signatures
Medium
A.Compute and compare it to
B.Decrypt with the signer's private key
C.Compute and compare it to
D.Compute and compare it to
Correct Answer: Compute and compare it to
Explanation:
Using the public exponent , the verifier computes and checks equality with the freshly computed hash of the message.
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36Why is a message typically hashed before being signed rather than signing the full message directly?
digital signatures
Medium
A.To share the signing key more easily
B.To encrypt the message before transmission
C.To make the signature reversible
D.To sign a fixed-size digest, improving efficiency and enabling arbitrary message lengths
Correct Answer: To sign a fixed-size digest, improving efficiency and enabling arbitrary message lengths
Explanation:
Signing the hash lets one signature cover a message of any length efficiently, since the signing operation works on the fixed-size digest instead of the entire message.
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37Which property do digital signatures provide that symmetric MACs do not?
digital signatures
Medium
A.Non-repudiation
B.Message integrity
C.Fixed-length output
D.Fast verification
Correct Answer: Non-repudiation
Explanation:
Since only the signer holds the private key, a valid signature binds the message to the signer, who cannot later deny signing it, giving non-repudiation that shared-key MACs lack.
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38The standard security definition for signature schemes requires resistance to which type of attack?
security requirements for signature schemes
Medium
A.Brute-force key recovery only
B.Replay attacks on the network layer
C.Timing side-channel attacks only
D.Existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack
Correct Answer: Existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack
Explanation:
A secure signature scheme must be existentially unforgeable even when the adversary can adaptively request signatures on chosen messages (EUF-CMA).
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39Textbook RSA signatures without hashing are vulnerable to a forgery based on which mathematical property?
security requirements for signature schemes
Medium
A.Commutativity of XOR
B.Multiplicativity:
C.Associativity of hashing
D.Additivity of the modulus
Correct Answer: Multiplicativity:
Explanation:
Because , an attacker can combine two signatures to forge a signature on the product. Hashing the message before signing prevents this.
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40In a signature scheme, what does an "existential forgery" specifically mean?
security requirements for signature schemes
Medium
A.The adversary recovers the signer's private key
B.The adversary decrypts an encrypted message
C.The adversary forges signatures for every possible message
D.The adversary produces a valid signature for at least one new message of their choosing
Correct Answer: The adversary produces a valid signature for at least one new message of their choosing
Explanation:
Existential forgery only requires the adversary to create one valid message-signature pair not previously seen; it does not require key recovery or forging arbitrary chosen messages.
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41A hash function produces -bit outputs. Due to the birthday paradox, the expected number of random inputs needed to find a collision with probability is closest to which value?
security of hash functions
Hard
A.
B.
C.
D.
Correct Answer:
Explanation:
Collision resistance is bounded by the birthday attack: about evaluations suffice to find a collision with probability near , which is why must be roughly doubled compared to preimage security.
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42Which relationship between hash-function security properties is correct?
If an attacker cannot find any colliding pair, they certainly cannot find a second message colliding with a given one. However collision resistance does not, in general, imply preimage resistance without additional assumptions.
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43Why is the naive construction using a Merkle–Damgård hash insecure?
message authentication codes
Hard
A.It produces outputs that are trivially invertible
B.It cannot process messages longer than the block size
C.It is vulnerable to a length-extension attack allowing forgery on
D.It leaks the key directly in the output
Correct Answer: It is vulnerable to a length-extension attack allowing forgery on
Explanation:
Merkle–Damgård hashes leak internal state as their output, so an attacker who knows can extend the message and compute a valid MAC on without knowing . HMAC's nested structure prevents this.
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44HMAC is defined as . What is the primary security benefit of the nested (two-pass) structure?
message authentication codes
Hard
A.It allows the key to be recovered for auditing
B.It removes the need for the underlying hash to be collision resistant at all
C.It makes the MAC output shorter than the hash output
D.It defeats length-extension attacks and reduces security to properties of the compression function
Correct Answer: It defeats length-extension attacks and reduces security to properties of the compression function
Explanation:
The outer hash conceals the inner hash's internal state, blocking length-extension. HMAC's proof reduces its PRF/MAC security to reasonable assumptions on the compression function, not to full collision resistance.
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45In textbook RSA signatures, . Given valid signatures on messages , an attacker can forge a signature on which message without the private key?
digital signatures
Hard
A., with signature
B., with signature
C.No forgery is ever possible against textbook RSA
D., with signature
Correct Answer: , with signature
Explanation:
RSA is multiplicatively homomorphic: . This existential forgery is why real schemes apply a hash and padding (e.g., RSA-PSS) before signing.
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46A signature scheme is EUF-CMA secure. Which statement precisely describes what the adversary must achieve to break it?
security requirements for signature schemes
Hard
A.Recover the signer's private key from public parameters
B.Produce two different messages with the same signature
C.Distinguish a real signature from a random string
D.Produce a valid signature on a message never queried to the signing oracle
Correct Answer: Produce a valid signature on a message never queried to the signing oracle
Explanation:
Existential Unforgeability under Chosen-Message Attack requires the adversary, even after adaptively obtaining signatures on messages of its choice, to forge a valid signature on some new (unqueried) message. Key recovery is a stronger break, not the definition.
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47In ECDSA/DSA, reusing the same per-signature nonce for two different messages allows an attacker to recover which secret?
digital signatures
Hard
A.The signer's long-term private key
B.The modulus
C.The hash function's initialization vector
D.The public key only
Correct Answer: The signer's long-term private key
Explanation:
With equal , the two signatures share , and lets the attacker solve for , then recover the private key . This flaw famously compromised the Sony PS3 signing key.
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48A file's integrity is protected by publishing over an insecure channel where an attacker can modify both and the stored digest. What property is actually required for meaningful protection here?
hash functions and data integrity
Hard
A.The hash must be preimage resistant only
B.The digest channel must be authenticated; the hash alone provides no integrity if the attacker controls both
C.The hash must be a keyed function using the file contents as the key
D.The hash output length must exceed the message length
Correct Answer: The digest channel must be authenticated; the hash alone provides no integrity if the attacker controls both
Explanation:
An unkeyed hash detects accidental corruption, but if an adversary can alter both message and digest, they simply recompute . Integrity against active adversaries needs an authenticated digest (e.g., via a MAC or signature).
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49The 'random oracle model' is often used in security proofs. Which is the most accurate critique of relying on it?
security of hash functions
Hard
A.It requires the hash output to be shorter than the input
B.No real hash function is a true random oracle, so ROM proofs are heuristic and can be uninstantiable
C.It only applies to symmetric encryption, not hashing
D.It makes proofs impossible to construct
Correct Answer: No real hash function is a true random oracle, so ROM proofs are heuristic and can be uninstantiable
Explanation:
The ROM treats as an ideal random function. Canetti–Goldreich–Halevi showed schemes secure in the ROM that are insecure under any concrete instantiation, so ROM security is a strong heuristic, not a full guarantee.
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50Consider verifying a MAC by comparing bytes with an early-exit comparison (returns as soon as a mismatch is found). What vulnerability does this introduce?
message authentication codes
Hard
A.A key-recovery attack via collisions
B.A replay attack across sessions
C.A length-extension attack on the tag
D.A timing side channel that lets an attacker forge tags byte-by-byte
Correct Answer: A timing side channel that lets an attacker forge tags byte-by-byte
Explanation:
Non-constant-time comparison leaks how many leading bytes matched via timing. An attacker can adaptively guess the tag one byte at a time, so MAC verification must use constant-time comparison.
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51In the 'hash-then-sign' paradigm, why must the hash function be collision resistant for the overall signature to be secure?
digital signatures
Hard
A.A collision turns a legitimate signature on into a valid signature on
B.Collisions let the attacker recover the private exponent
C.Collision resistance is needed to keep the signature short
D.Collisions allow decryption of the message
Correct Answer: A collision turns a legitimate signature on into a valid signature on
Explanation:
The signature is computed on . If , any signature valid for is automatically valid for , enabling forgery. This is why MD5-based signature forgeries (e.g., rogue CA certificates) were possible.
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52Which attack model is the STRONGEST (hardest to resist), such that security under it implies security under the others?
security requirements for signature schemes
Hard
A.No-message attack aiming at universal forgery
B.Key-only attack aiming at selective forgery
C.Adaptive chosen-message attack aiming at existential forgery
D.Known-message attack aiming at total break
Correct Answer: Adaptive chosen-message attack aiming at existential forgery
Explanation:
The strongest standard notion combines the most powerful attacker capability (adaptive chosen-message queries) with the weakest forgery goal (existential — any new valid message). Resisting this implies resisting weaker attacker models and harder goals.
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53A Merkle tree is used to verify integrity of a large dataset split into leaves. What is the size of the authentication path (proof) that a verifier needs to check a single leaf?
hash functions and data integrity
Hard
A. hash values
B. hash values regardless of
C. hash values
D. hash values
Correct Answer: hash values
Explanation:
A Merkle proof supplies one sibling hash at each level from the leaf up to the root, so its length equals the tree height , giving logarithmic-size integrity proofs.
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54A MAC provides authentication but a plain digital signature additionally provides which property that a symmetric MAC cannot?
message authentication codes
Hard
A.Faster verification than any MAC
B.Non-repudiation, since only the signer holds the private key
C.Resistance to replay attacks by default
D.Confidentiality of the message
Correct Answer: Non-repudiation, since only the signer holds the private key
Explanation:
MACs use a shared secret, so either party could have produced a tag — no third party can attribute it. Signatures use the signer's private key, giving non-repudiation. Neither MACs nor signatures inherently provide confidentiality or replay protection.
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55An attacker performs a precomputation of hash values stored in a table to invert a -bit hash. Why does this classic time–memory tradeoff fail against modern password hashing?
security of hash functions
Hard
A.The hash output becomes shorter than the table
B.Salts increase the collision probability to
C.Per-user salts make precomputed tables useless because each password uses a distinct hash instance
D.The table cannot store 128-bit values
Correct Answer: Per-user salts make precomputed tables useless because each password uses a distinct hash instance
Explanation:
A unique random salt per password means a precomputed rainbow table for one salt is worthless for others, forcing the attacker to redo work per target. Salting (plus slow/memory-hard functions) defeats generic precomputation.
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56RSA-PSS is preferred over deterministic PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures primarily because:
digital signatures
Hard
A.It avoids using a hash function entirely
B.It has a tight security reduction to the RSA problem in the random oracle model via randomized padding
C.It produces shorter signatures
D.It allows signature verification without the public key
Correct Answer: It has a tight security reduction to the RSA problem in the random oracle model via randomized padding
Explanation:
PSS uses randomized, provably secure padding with a tight reduction to RSA in the ROM. PKCS#1 v1.5 is deterministic and lacks such a clean proof, making PSS the recommended modern choice.
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57Consider a signature scheme that is EUF-CMA secure but malleable: given a valid an attacker can produce with also valid. Is this a violation of EUF-CMA?
security requirements for signature schemes
Hard
A.Yes, because any new valid signature counts as a forgery
B.No, because the forged signature is on an already-queried message
C.No, because malleability is impossible under EUF-CMA
D.Yes, because differs from
Correct Answer: No, because the forged signature is on an already-queried message
Explanation:
EUF-CMA only forbids forgeries on new messages. Producing a different valid signature on the same message is not an EUF-CMA break; the stronger notion of Strong Unforgeability (sEUF-CMA) is needed to rule out such malleability.
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58CBC-MAC is secure for fixed-length messages but insecure for variable-length messages. What is the core reason?
message authentication codes
Hard
A.The IV is leaked in the tag
B.An attacker can concatenate messages to forge tags because the tag of one message can seed another
C.The block cipher becomes invertible
D.The key length shrinks with message length
Correct Answer: An attacker can concatenate messages to forge tags because the tag of one message can seed another
Explanation:
For variable lengths, knowing and lets an attacker construct a valid tag for a crafted concatenation via XOR relations on the chaining values. Fixes like CMAC/EMAC add length-dependent processing.
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59For a hash with -bit output, which set of expected work factors correctly matches (preimage, second-preimage, collision) resistance under generic attacks?
hash functions and data integrity
Hard
A.
B.
C.
D.
Correct Answer:
Explanation:
Generic preimage and second-preimage attacks cost about , while the birthday bound makes generic collisions cost only . This asymmetry drives the choice of output length for collision-critical applications.
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60In the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), the verification recomputes and accepts if . What role does the secret nonce play in security?
digital signatures
Hard
A.It equals the private key raised to the message hash
B.It only affects verification speed, not security
C.It is published as part of the signature for verification
D.It must be unique and unpredictable per signature; leakage or reuse exposes the private key
Correct Answer: It must be unique and unpredictable per signature; leakage or reuse exposes the private key
Explanation:
is a fresh secret nonce. If it repeats, is predictable, or partially leaks, an attacker can solve for the private key . RFC 6979 derives deterministically to avoid weak randomness.
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